By using unique survey data, we conduct a detailed study of the gender salary gap within economics departments in Japan. Despite the presence of rigid pay scales emphasizing age and experience, there is a 7% gender salary gap after controlling for rank and detailed personal, job, institutional and human capital characteristics. This gender salary gap exists within ranks. We find no gender promotion differences. In addition, we find a concentration of the salary gap in public universities and in research oriented universities. Our results show no evidence that the gender salary gap is reducing over time, and reject the hypothesis that females' choice between household work and market activities is responsible for the gender salary gap.
Introduction
Labor market discrimination is a situation in which an otherwise identical person is treated differently by virtue of that person's gender or race. A large part of the literature on labor market discrimination focuses on the problem of gender salary gap. This paper seeks to explore the issues of gender salary gap among Japanese academic economists.
There is substantial literature that examines the gender salary gap within the academic profession in the US and the UK (Broder, 1993; McNabb & Wass, 1997; Ward, 2001; Ginther & Hayes, 2003; Blackaby, Booth & Frank, 2005) . Most of these studies found that much of the gender salary gap stems from the gender differences in rank attainment. By using data from Scottish universities, Ward (2001) found that female academics receive 7% lower salary than males, after controlling for various characteristics but without controlling for rank. When rank was controlled for, the estimated salary gap reduced to 3.2% and became statistically insignificant. By using data from the Surveys of Doctorate Recipients in the US, Ginther and Hayes (2003) found negligible gender salary differences within rank, but substantial gender differences in rank attainment.
In contrast to the abundance of literature in the US and the UK, there have been few studies about the gender salary gap within Japanese academia despite a growing public interest in gender equality in Japan. In 1999, the Japanese government enacted the Basic Law for a Gender-equal Society. Consequently, in 2000, the Association of National Universities set out an 'Action Plan' stipulating that national universities should increase the proportion of female academics to 20% by 2010. In 2008, the Ministry of Education, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) announced that it would provide 6 million yen in support to selected universities for each female academic hired. Despite such an interest in achieving gender equality, evidence regarding the presence or the absence of a gender salary gap within Japanese academia is not well established. Fujimura (2002) estimated a salary equation using 648 Japanese academics from the 1992 Carnegie International Survey of the Academic Profession. He found a negative female coefficient for national universities, and a negative but statistically insignificant female coefficient for private universities. However, his model had limited control variables, lacking department dummies (except for the medical department) and other important institutional, job and personal characteristics. Senoo, Matsushige & Umezaka (2002) also estimated a salary equation for a sample of Japanese academics. They found a negative but insignificant female coefficient. However, their sample was too small (49 academics) and the regression contained too few controls (age and gender only).
Academic salary in Japan is determined by rigid pay scales where salaries are largely determined by experience, age and educational attainment. One might expect that the existence of these pay scales would ensure gender equality in salary. Nevertheless, whether there is a gender salary gap is still an empirical question.
We conduct one of the first and the most detailed study of gender salary differences within Japanese academia by using an original data set that we collected via a mail survey administered in 2008. Our study focuses on academic economists. The data contain detailed personal, job, institutional and productivity characteristics. We first establish that in fact there exists a 7% gender salary gap within Japanese economics departments. To illustrate the reasons for this, we then examine whether the gap is concentrated among particular groups of faculty. In doing so, we focus on the following characteristics: rank, experience, type of university and research orientation. In addition, we examine if the gender salary gap is caused by the females' choice between household work and market activities. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the background information.
Section 3 describes the methodology. Section 4 presents the data, and Section 5 presents the descriptive statistics. Section 6 estimates the gender salary gap, and Section 7 disaggregates pay disparities by characteristics. Section 8 discusses the results, and Section 9 concludes.
Compensation Scheme in Japanese Universities
There are three types of universities in Japan: national, public and private. National universities are established and funded by the central government. Public universities are established by local governments, and funded by both the local and the central governments.
Private universities are established by private entities and are financially self-supporting.
The total annual salary of academics includes: monthly salary for 12 months, bonuses and allowances. Bonuses are typically provided twice a year, and the total amount can be equivalent to four to six months' worth of salary.
Salary is determined by a relatively rigid pay scale called the salary table. Although all types of universities have the freedom to set their own salary table, national universities typically follow the guidelines provided by the National Personnel Authority (NPA).
1 Most private universities set their own salary tables; however, there are some private universities that follow the NPA guidelines.
A salary table stipulates how salaries should progress depending on rank. Table 1 shows   the salary table guideline set by the NPA. A salary table contains classes and divisions, where classes refer to ranks. A full-time academic usually starts as a lecturer or assistant professor, and then moves up the ladder to the full professor rank. Each class contains a number of divisions (pay scales). A faculty member's position on the pay scale is assigned by the university's personnel division, which is run by non-academic staff.
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In principle, the salary is determined as follows.
3 First, the initial division (at hiring) is determined based on age, previous experience and educational attainment. Then, a faculty member moves one division annually. Faculty with substantial academic achievements may be allowed to skip divisions, though there has been no investigation into how commonly division skips are awarded, and whether they are indeed awarded based on academic achievements. In sum, although there is some room for discretion, academic salary is in principle largely a function of age, experience and educational attainment.
Allowances usually include a 'dependent spouse allowance' and a 'dependent child allowance' (up to age 22). The dependent spouse allowance is given to academics whose spouses have an annual income less than 1.3 million yen (for national/public universities), or less than 1.03 million yen (for private universities). In addition, universities may adjust remuneration for the cost of living based on the university location. In fact, national and public universities have additional 'cost of living adjustment allowances'. For example, national and public universities located in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (within Tokyo's 23 wards) have a cost of living adjustment allowance equivalent to 18% of the monthly base salary. Universities located in other large cities receive allowances ranging between 6-12%.
In our estimation, we control for five location dummies.
In April 2004 national and public universities were 'corporatized' based on the National University Corporation Law. Prior to this, the salary tables at national and public universities were determined by the NPA according to the public servant payment schemes set by the government, thus, salary tables were the same at every national and public university.
After the 'corporatization', national and public universities gained the freedom to set their own salary tables. However, as mentioned above, national and public universities typically follow the guidelines provided by the NPA. The 'corporatization' meant a change in the legal status of academics by removing their public employee status, and allowing university management more freedom in setting compensation schemes.
Empirical Methodology
In the literature, two methods are commonly used to investigate the gender salary gap. On the one hand, there is the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973) which requires running separate earning regressions for males and females. On the other hand, one can estimate a salary equation for the pooled sample with a female dummy included. As will be noted in Section 4, our data contain 337 academics out of which 58 are female. We, therefore, decided that the number of females is not large enough to apply the Oaxaca decomposition. Thus, we have chosen the pooled regression method. Below is our earning equation:
Z i is the vector of variables that directly affect annual salary. We include rank dummies for full professors, associate professors and lecturers. The excluded category is the assistant professors. The female dummy captures the gender salary gap after controlling for objective salary determinants.
This method faces at least three econometric issues. First, human capital variables may be noisy and biased proxies for actual human capital accumulation. For example, education is a widely used proxy for human capital. If the actual human capital is lower for females than males at a given level of education, we tend to overestimate the gender salary gap. We tackle this problem by incorporating detailed productivity characteristics, such as publications and the amount of external grants, in addition to education and experience.
In fact, one benefit of analyzing the academic labor market is that various productivity characteristics can be controlled for, thus minimizing potential biases.
Second, rank attainment may be affected by discrimination. In such a situation, the female dummy fails to capture the salary discrimination that operates through gender promotion differences. We mitigate this problem by estimating the salary equation both with and without rank variables. When the rank variables are excluded, the female dummy captures the total effect of discrimination stemming from salary and promotion discrimination combined.
Third, self-selection into the academic labor force might be a potential source of bias in the female coefficient. Since we only observe a sample of those working in academia, we cannot directly control for the selection bias. However, we investigate whether selection bias is a problem by utilizing statistics for male and female PhD graduates in Japan for the period 1969 to 2007.
Data
The data were obtained from a survey we administered via postal questionnaire. The questionnaire can be found in the online supplemental material. Our survey method follows. One may also be concerned with the over-representation of full professors due to nonrandom responses since in mail surveys of academics such a problem is not uncommon (Blackaby et al., 2005; Moore et al., 2007) . In our sample, 63% of respondents are full professors. However, according to the MEXT Statistics of School Education, 60% of academics in economics departments in Japan were full professors in 2007. Thus, the difference for our sample is minor when compared to past studies. 9 Finally, we under-sampled private universities. According to the MEXT Statistics of School Education, 73% of academic economists work in private universities while only 59% of our sample work in private universities. 
Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Variables are summarized in Table 2 . The dependent variable is the log of annual salary (including the 12-month salary, bonuses and allowances). We did not specifically ask respondents to exclude earnings from other institutions (such as income from teaching in other universities), assuming that respondents will report income from the current institution only. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that such income has been included in the reported annual salary. In Section 6.2, we discuss the possible consequences of this on our estimations.
We control for an extensive number of personal, job, institutional and human capital characteristics. Though most variables are self-explanatory, some variables require explanations. In Japanese universities, academics typically teach weekly seminars (zemi ) to provide guidance for thesis writing. We control for the number of zemi taught during the previous year.
To control for cost of living adjustments (see Section 2), we include five location dummies based on the NPA's university location classifications. For example, (Class 1 Cities) is the dummy for the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, and (Class 2 Cities) includes Osaka and other second tier cities, and so on with decreasingly large cities denoted by class. University locations are identified from the postmarks stamped on the returning envelopes. Since questionnaires were sent directly to university addresses, the university location should be in/near the city where the returning envelopes were posted from.
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MEXT offers a competitive grant called the Center of Excellence grant (COE). A COE
grant is offered at the department level, but is distributed only to those involved in the COE project. According to Arimoto (2007) , 51% of COE grants were awarded to the top ten national universities in 2006. The variable (COE grant) shows the amount of COE grants each respondent received. This variable captures the effect of working in a top university and being involved in a COE project.
The publication variables include the number of journal articles, working papers, books, books edited, book chapters and textbooks. For each type, we distinguish publications as either single-authored or co-authored. To control for publication quality, we asked respondents to report the number of publications according to whether they were published in Japan or in the US/Europe. Since most of the top journals are published in the US/Europe, we can partially control for the quality by distinguishing publications in the US/Europe.
Obviously, this method of controlling for publication quality is not perfect, thus the estimated gender gap is still an upper bound of the true gap. However, there is evidence that, on average, articles published in the US/Europe have higher academic value than articles published in Japan. For example, articles published in the US/Europe increase academic job mobility much more than articles published in Japan (note, the majority of job moves can be considered voluntary due to the prevalence of life-time contracts in Japanese academia).
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Moreover, the majority of the literature controls only for the number of publications (e.g., Ginther and Hayes, 2003; Monks and Robinson, 2000; Toutkoushian, 1998; Ransom & Megdal, 1993; Ward, 2001 ) while some studies do not control for publications at all (e.g., , 1997; Toumanoff, 2005) . Thus, our method is a useful step forward.
McNabb and Wass
It is not clear from the literature how a failure to control for publication quality would affect the gender salary gap. Blackaby et al. (2005) and Moore et al. (2007) controlled for the quality of publications by distinguishing top tier articles. However, they did not show how the gender salary gap would change if quality had not been controlled for.
Descriptive statistics: Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics by gender. Males are older, more experienced, and receive higher salaries. Rank distribution differs by gender with; 67% of males and only 43% of females employed as full professors. Whether this difference in rank attainment reflects discrimination will be one of our focuses. Only 3% of males took career breaks compared with 12% of females. Females are more likely than males to be found in private universities. There are no significant differences between genders in terms of their highest educational achievements; 65% of males and 64% of females have PhD degrees. The number of articles is slightly higher for males in all categories, though the differences are not statistically significant. Figure 1A plots experience-salary profiles by gender. Females' profile lies below males', and the profiles by gender diverge with experience, especially after 25 years of experience.
This appears to support the view that the treatment of females has improved overtime.
Since such a trend has been found in the US (Toutkoushian, 1998), we take a closer look at the gender salary gap by experience in Section 7. Note, however, that there are only three female observations with experience greater than 25 years. Thus, the divergence could be due to outliers. The seniority-experience profiles in Figure 1B also show a similar divergence. Table 3 reports two sets of OLS estimates, each using different publication measurements.
Estimation Results
We present the results for each model separately, with rank variables included and excluded.
OLS 1 uses the most detailed publication measures, with publications in the US/Europe separated from publications in Japan. When rank variables are included, there is a statistically significant gender salary gap of 7.3%. 13 Thus, despite the existence of rigid pay scales, there does exist a gender salary gap in economics departments in Japan.
Full professors have a 16% salary premium compared to assistant professors. Associate professors' salary premium is positive but insignificant. The effects of experience and seniority are statistically insignificant. None of the publication variables have significant effects on salary at the 5% significance level. While we were conducting this research, we talked to a number of Japanese academics. We often heard that, in Japanese academia, publications do not affect salary since salary is determined by the salary table, which is largely a function of experience and age. The insignificant effects of publications render some support to this conjecture.
When OLS 1 is estimated without rank, the gender salary gap reduces only slightly from 7.3% to 6.7% (surprisingly, it does not increase). Thus, the female coefficient is almost unaffected by the exclusion of rank variables, indicating that there is a large salary gap within ranks, but there are no gender differences in rank attainment. To check the robustness of the gender gap estimates to our measures of research output, OLS 2 combines publications that are published in Japan and in the US/Europe (which means that OLS 2 does not control for publication quality). In addition, we combine single authored and co-authored publications. 14 When rank is included, the estimated gender salary gap is unchanged (7.3%) and remains significant. When rank is excluded, the gap only slightly reduces to 6.8%. Again, the female coefficient is largely insensitive to the exclusion of rank variables.
Thus, all estimates suggest that there is a significant gender salary gap within ranks, but there is no gender promotion gap. To confirm that there is no gender promotion gap,
we estimated an ordered-logit rank attainment regression (not reported here) by using the same control variables as in OLS 1. The female coefficient was positive but insignificant (0.13), and the estimated marginal effect was close to zero.
Have We Controlled for Enough Institutional Characteristics?
Although academic salary is determined by rigid salary tables, salary tables can differ among universities. Thus, one might wonder if the estimated gender salary gap could be driven by unobserved institutional differences. It is important to note that we controlled for various institutional characteristics such as the type of university, whether the department offers a
PhD and the location of the university. In addition, we controlled for COE grants which capture institutional quality (see Section 5).
However, we did not control for department ranking, since such information was not available in our data. Since department ranking would be a better variable to distinguish institutional quality, we decided to gather additional data to check whether the estimated gender salary gap is driven by the omitted department rankings. is a commonly used index to measure the the departmental ranking in Japan. The higher the hensachi, the higher the ranking. In addition, we collected information on university location, standard teaching load (the number of 90 minute classes), and whether the economics department offers a PhD. Table 4 shows the data. The annual model salary includes salary, bonuses and allowances.
To examine the relationship between salary and department rankings, we estimate a log salary equation using the 18 observations. Results are shown in Table 4 . The location dummies have positive effects, indicating that private universities adjust for the cost of living. However, the coefficient for hensachi is small (-0.0009) and statistically insignificant.
Although it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from such a small data set, the results suggest that location is a more significant determinant of salary differences among universities than department ranking. Thus, we believe that the omission of department ranking does not significantly bias our results.
Is the Estimated Gender Salary Gap Influenced by Income from Other Institutions?
One caveat of our data is that we did not specifically ask respondents to exclude income from other institutions when they reported salary. If males earned more than females from other institutions, the female coefficient would have overstated the gender salary gap. However, according to Fujimura (2002, p.124) , who estimated the determinants of earnings from other institutions for a sample of Japanese academics, income earned from other institutions was, in fact, higher for females, though the difference was not statistically significant. Thus, we believe that our data do not overstate the gender salary gap.
Sample Selection Bias
Since we only observe a sample of those working in academia, we cannot directly control for biases in the gender gap due to self-selection into the academic labor force. Thus, we discuss the potential direction of biases by examining MEXT Statistics of School Education, which contain statistics of PhD graduates in social sciences.
16 Figure 2A Figure 2B shows the trend in the percentages of these graduates who entered academia (participation rates). 17 Until 1990, males had a much higher participation rate (77% on average) than females (34% on average). However, the participation rates converged after 1990, with the average participation rates for males and females at 65% and 64%, respectively.
On the one hand, females' lower participation rate prior to 1990 could be a source of bias in the gender salary gap. If females whose potential salary in academia would be low decided not to join academia, the gender gap would be underestimated. On the other hand, if the convergence in the participation rates had been the result of policies to increase female faculty (see Introduction), the gender salary gap may be overstated since these policies might draw females with relatively low productivity into academia. However, the latter possibility is unlikely. First, the Action Plan (see Introduction) was unlikely to have caused this convergence since it was implemented in 2001, 10 years after the convergence started. Second, MEXT's decision to provide subsidies for hiring female academics was not implemented at the time of our survey. Taken together, the gender salary gap could be underestimated.
Disaggregating Pay Disparities
Results so far show clear evidence that, in aggregate, there is a gender salary gap of about 7%. To illustrate why there is a gap, we examine whether the gap is concentrated among particular groups of faculty. Although there are many ways to disaggregate the gap, we focus on the following characteristics: rank, experience, type of university and research orientation. In addition, we examine whether the gender salary gap is caused by the females' choice between household work and market activities.
Pay Disparity by Rank
We have indicated that a gender salary gap exists within ranks. This can be tested by including interactions between female and the rank variables. The gender salary gap within each rank is given by β (f emale) +β (f emale×rank variable) , where β (·) denotes the coefficient for the variable in the subscript. Table 5A summarizes the gender salary gap within each rank, with the Appendix showing the corresponding coefficient estimates. There is an 11% gender salary gap in the full professor rank. In the associate professor rank, the gap is small and insignificant (3%). In the assistant professor rank the gender gap is 13%, albeit insignificant. At the lecturer level, females seem to earn higher salary than males, though there are only four observations in this group, among which only one is female. Even though the evidence of a gender salary gap in the associate professor rank and below is weak, results are consistent with our earlier conclusion that the gender salary gap exists within ranks.
Pay Disparity by Experience
Examination of pay disparities by experience is important for two reasons. First, experiencesalary profiles by gender diverge with experience ( Figure 1A) , which seems to suggest that the treatment of females has improved overtime. Since the gender salary gap has been found to be decreasing in the US (Ransom and Megdal, 1993; Toutkoushian, 1998; Ginther and Hayes, 2003) , we need to examine if the same trend can be found in Japan. Second, the divergence in experience-salary profiles could be the result of the gender gap being concentrated in the full professor rank. Thus, we need to disentangle these two explanations.
To begin with, we interact female dummy with four different experience dummies, one at a time. These dummies are for experience greater than or equal to 25, 20, 15 and 10 years.
The gender gap in each cell is computed similarly to the previous subsection. Table 5B shows the results. When we divide the cell at 25 years of experience (B-1), the gender salary gap for more experienced academics is 22%, but insignificant. The gender gap for less experienced academics is 6.8%, and is significant. Note that, there are only 3 females with experience greater than 25, which may be the reason for the insignificant gender salary gap for more experienced academics. Similarly, when we divide the cell at 20 years (B-2) or at 15 years of experience (B-3), the gender salary gaps are not significant for more experienced academics, but are significant for less experienced workers. The point estimates of the gaps are similar for both more and less experienced academics (around 7%). Only when we divide the cell at 10 years of experience (B-4), do we find a clear concentration of the gender salary gap for more experienced workers (9.5%).
We also find a greater gender gap for more experienced academics when female dummy is interacted with academic experience in years (not reported here). The gap at t years of experience is given by β (f emale) +tβ (f emale×experience) . The gap at one year of experience is 5%, but not significant. At 10 years of experience, the gap increases to 9% and is significant.
The gap is statistically significant at any experience greater than 10.
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Caution must be exercised before drawing the conclusion that the gender gap has declined over time, since the gender gap concentration for more experienced academics could be the result of the gender gap being concentrated in the full professor rank. To disentangle these two explanations, we include female-rank interactions together with female-experience interactions. Since there is no female professor with experience less than 10, we use the dummy for experience greater than or equal to 15.
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Table 5 (C-1) summarizes the gender salary gap in each rank-experience cell. First, consider academics in the full professor rank. Within this rank, the gender salary gap is 9%
(p-value=0.08) for more experienced academics and 16% (p-value=0.02) for less experienced academics. Similarly, the gaps are greater for less experienced academics of other ranks, though they are insignificant. Thus, we find to the contrary that the gap is greater for less experienced academics.
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The above results suggest that when females are promoted to full professors, their salaries are not adjusted as much as males', but that the gap reduces with time in rank as a full professor. To check this, we additionally control for time in rank as a full professor, (time in rank)×(female) interaction, as well as (time in rank)×(exp≥15)×(female) interaction.
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For ease of interpretation, we compute the gender gap in the first year, and in the fifth year as a full professor. Results are reported in Table 5 (C-2). We find to the contrary that the gender gap within the full professor rank is increasing with time in rank. However, we find that (i) the gap at the time of promotion is greater for the newer cohort (exp<15 years) than older cohort (exp≥15 years), and (ii) the rate at which the gap increases with time in rank is greater for the newer cohort (1.6% per year and 0.05% per year for the newer and older cohorts, respectively). These results indicate that the gender salary gap is greater for the newer cohort. Thus, the fact that female professors are relatively less experienced would in part explain the aggregate gender salary gap.
22
In sum, we found some evidence that the gender salary gap increases with time in rank as a full professor. The analysis also confirmed that the gender salary gaps are concentrated in the full professor rank. These two findings would explain the divergence in the experiencesalary profiles found in Figure 1A . However, we did not find evidence that the gender salary gap is reducing overtime. On the contrary, the gender salary gap is greater for newer cohorts. Note that Blackaby et al. (2005) also found no evidence that gender salary gap increases with experience in the UK academia.
Pay Disparity by Type of University
Until 2004, salary tables for national and public universities were determined by the NPA while salary setting for private universities had been less regulated. Since private universities have had more discretion over pay setting, the gender salary gap may manifest more easily in private universities. To check this, we interact female with the private and public university dummies. The excluded category is the national university. Table 5D shows the results. The estimated gender gap is 7.6% for private universities, but is insignificant. For national universities, the gender gap is smaller and also insignificant (4%). Given these results, we can reject the possibility that the gender gap concentration in private universities is the exclusive source of the aggregate gender salary gap.
Unexpectedly, we find a large gender gap for public universities (17%). This raises the concern that the aggregate gender gap could be driven by the public university observations. Therefore, we estimate OLS 1 by excluding public university observations (results not reported). As such, the gender salary gap decreases to 6.4% (p-value=0.08). Thus, the gender gap concentration in public universities appears to explain in part the aggregate gender salary gap.
Pay Disparity by Research Orientation
Evaluation of teaching quality is difficult due to its multi-dimensional nature, while evaluation of research quality is relatively easy, since journal quality can be evaluated by using citation indices. Then, the statistical discrimination arguments (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973; Aigner & Cain, 1977) imply that the gender salary gap would be concentrated in teaching oriented universities. To check this possibility, we interact female with the dummy for PhD offering departments. PhD offering departments are expected to be more research oriented, therefore less teaching oriented. Table 5E shows the results. The gender salary gap is 9.2% for PhD offering departments, while it is 4.5% and insignificant for non PhD offering departments. Thus, contrary to our expectation, we find a larger gender salary gap for research oriented universities. Toutkoushian (1998) also found that research oriented universities have a larger gender salary gap in the US.
Females in research universities have fewer publications than males (average number of refereed articles are 6 and 9 for females and males, respectively). While in aggregate we did not find significant effects of publications on salary, research oriented departments may take publications into account in setting salary . Thus, fewer publications by females may be one reason for the gender gap within these departments, and thus may partially explain the aggregate gender salary gap. Johnson & Stafford (1974) argued that the females' voluntary choice between household work and market activities is responsible for the gender salary gap in US academia. If this is true, the gender salary gap should concentrate more for married academics than single academics. This is because, while married females may spend more time for household work at the expense of market activities due to child rearing and other responsibilities, single females' choices should more closely parallel males'.
Household Work and the Gender Salary Gap
To check this, we interact female with the marital status dummy. Results are shown in Table 5F . The gender salary gap for married academics is 6%, but insignificant. Contrary to our expectation, we find a larger and significant gender salary gap for single academics (11%). This result does not support the view that females' choice to spend more time for household work is responsible for the gender salary gap.
Another way to examine Johnson and Stafford's explanation is to see if household work
would explain away the gender salary gap. Our survey asked respondents to report the percentage of total household work they usually perform. On average, female academics perform a greater percentage of household work than males (68% and 33%, respectively).
One problem is that this variable only captures current household work, while cumulative household work in the past might be the cause of the gender salary gap. Nevertheless, current household work should correlate to one's taste for household work. Thus, this variable captures, at least partially, the cumulative effect of household work on salary.
Another problem is that total household work varies with the size of the household, or with the existence of young children. Thus, we interact the household work (in percentage) with the household size and the number of children aged 6 or less. These variables are then added to OLS 1. Table 6 shows the result. The female coefficient is almost unchanged (7.3%). Thus, our results reject the explanation that females' choice to spend more time on household work is the source of the gender gap.
Discussions
We have found that, in aggregate, there is a gender salary gap of 7.3%. Now we ask why there is a gender salary gap. After examining the gender salary gap by characteristics, several explanations have been rejected. First, the aggregate gender salary gap does not arise from a concentration of the gender gap among more experienced workers. Second, the aggregate gap is not caused by a concentration of the gap in private universities or in teaching oriented universities. Third, there is little evidence that the females' choice between household work and market activities is responsible for the gap. We found, however, that the gender salary gap is concentrated in public universities. We also found a concentration of the gap in research oriented universities where female faculty have fewer publications.
These may provide partial explanations for the aggregate gender salary gap.
Another possible explanation is that gender differences in job mobility are the reason for the gender salary gap. Female academics would be less mobile than male academics, since their husbands would not be able to change their job locations easily. Then, in line with Ransom's (1993) arguments, females' lower job mobility provides monopsonistic power to university employers, which might in turn reduce female salaries. However, this possibility is unlikely in our case. Although the number of universities that academics have worked at in their career is fewer for females than males on average (1.53 and 1.65 universities, respectively), the number of universities worked per year of academic experience is slightly higher for females than males (1.06 and 1.05 universities per year, respectively).
Furthermore, the number of universities an academic has previously worked at is controlled for in the salary equation.
One notable finding is that the gender salary gap did not arise from the gender promotion gap. Rather, the salary gap exists within ranks. Although there are important studies such as Ginther (2004) that found significant gender salary gaps within ranks, many earlier studies from the US and UK found that much of the gender salary gap stems from the gender promotion gap, and there is little gender salary gap within ranks. Therefore, the pattern of the gender salary gap in Japan appears to be the opposite. Though purely speculative, here we provide some explanations for this pattern.
First, the gender salary gap in Japanese academia has never been scrutinized, while the rank attainment gap can be more easily detected since rank attainment is usually public information and the research outputs are easy to find. In such circumstances, taste-based discrimination may manifest more easily as a gender salary gap, where discrimination is hard to detect, than as a rank attainment gap where discrimination is easier to detect.
Another factor that deserves attention is who determines salaries and promotions. In Japanese universities, salaries are determined by personnel divisions consisting of nonacademic staff, while promotions are determined at the department level by faculty members. Our results imply that decisions made by the departments are more gender-equal than those made by personnel divisions.
It is not clear, however, why personnel divisions are necessarily more gender biased.
On the one hand, personnel divisions may not have as much expertise in judging academic achievements. Thus, in line with Aigner and Cain's (1977) arguments, noisy assessments of academic performance could make personnel divisions susceptible to statistical discriminations. For example, due to a lack of expertise, word-of-mouth information may easily affect the assessments made by personnel divisions. In such a case, females' lack of a social network within the university may prevent their achievements from being properly understood by personnel divisions, causing their achievements to be assessed with greater noise.
On the other hand, decisions made at the department level are not necessarily more productivity-based than decisions made centrally. For example, a faculty member's research and teaching may have spill-overs across departments. In that case, the department's evaluation of his/her productivity may underestimate overall productivity at the university level. Therefore, a central unit may be better situated to consider university-level productivity effects. Moreover, the personal interests of promotion committee members at the department level could prevent productivity-based judgments, while a central unit would be more focused on productivity. Thus, we do not pursue this issue further for now, leaving it instead for future research.
Conclusion
By using a data set of academic economists from Japanese universities, we conducted one of the first and the most detailed study of the gender salary gap within Japanese academia.
Despite the existence of rigid pay scales that emphasize experience, age and educational attainment, we found a 7.3% gender salary gap after controlling for rank and detailed personal, job, institutional and human capital characteristics. We tested several explanations as to the reasons for a gender salary gap in aggregate. We found the gender salary gap concentrated within public universities and within research oriented universities, which would provide partial explanations for the aggregate gender salary gap. However, none of the other explanations were supported by the data. One notable finding is that the gender salary gap exists within ranks and does not stem from a gender promotion gap. Thus, in economics departments in Japan, gender discrimination appears to operate through salary rather than through promotion. This contrasts with many studies in the US and UK, which found that most of the gender salary gap stems indirectly from the gender promotion gap.
Policy makers' past efforts to achieve gender equality in Japanese academia have exclusively focused on hiring more female academics. An investigation into the gender salary gap has never been on their agenda. Nevertheless, the percentages of male and female PhD graduates hired by universities have been almost the same since 1990. Thus, our results suggest that policy makers and researchers should shift their focus towards monitoring salaries, rather than simply looking at the number of female academics.
Notes
1 NPA (Jinjiin) is a neutral, third-party organization dealing with public employee management. 2 According to our interviews with the Association of Private Universities of Japan (Nihon Shiritsu Daigaku Kyoukai ), and the Faculty and Staff Union of Japanese Universities (Zenkouku Daigaku Kosen Kyoshokuin Kumiai), the budget is decided at the university level by the personnel division considering not only the personnel costs but also other costs; thus, departments cannot independently determine the amount of salary.
3 The description is based on our interviews with the Faculty and Staff Union of Japanese Universities (Zenkouku Daigaku Kosen Kyoshokuin Kumiai). 4 We checked the first listed 100 private universities that did not provide website links. Among them 16% were women's universities and 60% were highly specialized (not only for women) universities without economics departments.
5 Often economics departments are combined with business departments to form a larger department. In this case, names from the business departments were also included.
6 Many Japanese economics departments also employ faculty specializing in language education; we eliminated such faculty where possible.
7 22 due to missing salary, 2 due to missing experience and 1 due to inconsistent answers regarding rank attainment.
8 Based on the mean comparison test at significance levels greater than 10%. 9 In Blackaby et al. (2005, p. 3) 28.5% of their sample are full professors, while the representation of full professors in the population is only 18.8% (UK academia). Similarly, Moore et al. (2007, pp.4-5) have 37.3% as full professors while the representation of full professors in the population is only 18.8% (UK academia).
10 This could be due to two factors. First, as compared to national and public universities, more private universities, especially newer universities, did not provide faculty names on their websites. Second, as noted earlier, we did not access many private universities' websites since their website links were not on the MEXT list.
11 Some postmarks were not readable. In addition, we were not able to locate those who replied online. However, we were able to identify the university location for 59.9% of all observations (66% of female observations). The observations with unidentified university location are included in the reference group.
12 See Authors (2010). 13 We report either the gender dummy coefficient or the gender difference in log salary as the 'gender salary gap' for easy identification in the tables. This is not the percentage difference in salary between genders given the semi-logarithmic specification. Percentage difference in salary can be computed as 100(exp(β-Var(β)/2)-1), where β is the gender coefficient (see Kennedy, 1981) .
14 When combining these publications, we divide the number of co-authored publications by 2, assuming that the number of co-authors is usually two.
15 The biggest cram schools in Japan conduct a mock university entrance examination for high school students at the national level. For each test taker, the standardized test score, or hensachi, is computed. In the following year, the cram schools monitor the actual admission outcomes of the same students who took the mock exam. Based on the actual admission outcomes, the average hensachi for those who are admitted to a particular department is computed. We use the departmental hensachi for analysis.
16 MEXT data do not have statistics for PhD graduates from overseas. The data also do not separate PhD graduates in economics.
17 Numbers include those who joined four-year universities as well as two-year colleges.
18 In addition, we estimated OLS 1 by successively dropping observations with experience greater than or equal to 25, 20, 15 and 10 years. The estimated female coefficients were, -0.068**(0.032), -0.097***(0.037), -0.063(0.043) and -0.055(0.058), respectively. Inside parentheses are the robust standard errors. This exercise also shows that the gap is smaller for less experienced academics. Note, however, that dropping the observations with experience≥25 or 20 does not significantly change the gender gap. This suggests that the 'problematic' observations, where the salary-experience profiles by gender exhibit a significant divergence, are not the exclusive source of the aggregate gender gap.
19 Results will not alter qualitatively even if the cutoff experience of 10 years is used instead. 20 To check the robustness of the results to the model specification we added female×rank×experience interactions in an unreported regression. This exercise did not significantly alter the estimated gender gap in each cell, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the full professor rank, the gender salary gap is 9% for more experienced academics and 15% for less experienced academics. Details are available upon request.
21 Average time in rank as a full professor is 12.8 and 6.5 years for males and females, respectively.
22 Average experience is 18 years and 24 years for female and male professors, respectively.
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Dependent variable
Annual salary (in 10,000 yen) These graphs show the average salary for different seniority and experience groups. Notes: Robust standard errors are reported. ***Significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at the 10% level. Regressions also include dummies for (Field missing), (#Students missing) (Internal grant missing), (COE grant missing), (External grant missing), (Publication missing). Numbers show the gender salary gap (the estimated log salary differences between genders) within each group. The corresponding coefficients are shown in the Appendix. ** Significant at the 5%, * at the 10% based on the F-test. Notes: Regressions include all other variables from the OLS 1. Standard errors are robust. ** Significant at the 5%, * at the 10%.
